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 The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent ocial positions of the
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis or of the Federal Reserve System.1 Introduction
The role of lobbying in policy making has been widely analyzed (for a survey see, for example,
Rodrik, 1995). The analysis of cross-border lobbying is however relatively under-researched.
Given the inter-connected nature of the global economy today, policies in one country can
signicantly aect nationals of other countries. This is particularly true for countries within
a trading block. Therefore, one would expect some degree of cross-border lobbying within
a Preferential Trading Area (PTA) whether it is a Free Trade Area (FTA) or a Customs
Union (CU).1;2 Schi and Winters (2003) discuss the case of lobbying in general, and of
cross-border lobbying in particular, in the EU. In fact, cross-border lobbying has become
widespread in the EU. Organizations such as Eurocommerce, EuroBio (European Association
for Bio-industries), and Friends of Europe are extremely active in EU-wide lobbying.
The incidence of cross-border lobbying in North-America is even more well documented.3
Gawande et al. (2006) nds that foreign lobbies play an important role in the determination
of U.S. taris. In a recent paper Stoyanov (2009) nds signicant impact of foreign lob-
bying on the Canadian trade policy and that foreign rms with preferential market access
lobby the Canadian government for more protection. In a similar vein, a lobby rm in the
U.S.A. writes on its website, \Holland & Knight's International Trade Group represents the
interests of ... foreign industries before the agencies of the United States Government, ..."
(www.hklaw.com/id16048/mpgid4844/).
1In an FTA, member nations trade freely among themselves, but set taris on non-members independently.
In a CU, on the other hand, in addition to intra-bloc free trade, the members set a common tari on
non-members, i.e., the common external tari (CET). North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA) and
the European Union (EU) are prominent examples of FTA and CU, respectively. The literature on the
economics of PTA dates back to Viner, 1950. There has been a renewed interest in the subject (see, for
example, Riezman, 1979; Gatsios and Karp, 1991 and 1995; Krishna, 1998; Panagariya and Krishna, 2002;
Bond et al., 2004, Raimondos-Mller and Woodland, 2006; Abrego at al., 2006; Melatos and Woodland,
2007.)
2There is a literature that examines the relationship of` multilateral trade agreements with preferential
ones (see, for example, Bagwell and Staiger, 1997, 1998; Bhagwati et al., 1998; Saggi, 1996).
3Quite detailed data in the U.S.A on lobbying rms, amount spent, and their clients can be found at
www.opensecret.org.
1In many countries, there are limits on lobbying, particularly lobbying in the form of
campaign contributions. The restrictions are however much more stringent for cross-border
lobbying than for domestic ones. In some countries campaign contributions from foreign
sources are completely disallowed. However, it is very dicult to legislate against non-
monetary form of lobbying, and, as mentioned above, these go on. However, for analytical
purposes, it is important to distinguish domestic lobbying from cross-border ones.
In the theoretical literature, the role of lobbying in formulating, and forming, a PTA has
been analyzed extensively (see, for example, Cadot et al., 1999; Richardson, 1994; Grossman
and Helpman, 1995 (appendix); Panagariya and Findlay, 1996; Bandyopadhyay and Wall,
1999). However, the eect of cross-border lobbying on the determination of domestic lobbying
and external taris in a PTA has not been examined much hitherto, and this is where the
main contribution of the present paper is. The works by Gwande et al. (2006) and Stoyanov
(2009), mentioned before, are primarily empirical. We examine the eect of foreign lobbying
on domestic trade policy via two channels: one is the direct eect of cross-border lobbying
on the behavior of the government, and the other is an indirect eect that rst aects the
level of domestic lobbying and thus government behavior. This paper considers a form of
lobbying that does not involve a transfer of money but has a cost to the lobby groups in
the form of resources. To be more specic, we consider the directly unproductive rent-
seeking activities (DUPs) approach to lobbying, incorporating and endogenizing in it the
tari-formation approach of Findlay and Wellisz (1982).4 We use a two-stage game where,
in the rst stage, the lobby groups decide on the levels of domestic lobbying, and in the
second stage external taris are determined. Given the equilibrium of this two-stage game,
we examine eect of cross-border lobbying on the level of domestic lobbying and on external
taris. We do so under two dierent types of PTA, viz., CU and FTA.
4There are many alternative approaches to modeling lobbying activities including the directly unpro-
ductive rent-seeking activities (DUPs) approach (Bhagwati, 1982), the tari-formation function approach
(Findlay and Wellisz, 1982), the political support function approach (Hillman, 1982), median voter approach
(Mayer, 1984), the campaign contribution approach (Magee et al., 1989), and the political contributions ap-
proach (Grossman and Helpman, 1994).
2In section 2, we analyze the case of CU, and then FTA is considered in section 3. The
analysis in these two sections are fairly general in nature and no specic assumptions are
made on the nature of the underlying economies. At the end of section 3 (in section 3.2),
we consider a specic oligopolistic model of FTA to see if the assumptions and conditions of
section 3 | under which the main results are derived | are satised for this specic model.
Some concluding remarks are made in section 4.
2 Customs Union
For simplicity, we consider a CU with two members, labeled A and B. The rest of the world
is labeled C. There is one non-numeraire good | we shall call this good \CU-importable"
| that is imported from C by A and B and subject to a CET t, which is decided by the CU
jointly. This decision is inuenced by lobbying from the producers of this good in A and B.
We assume lobbying is of the DUP type. Domestic producers of the CU-importable in
country i spend a total amount of hi (in units of some scarce resources) on lobbying both
governments. Since this lobbying is socially unproductive, it entails a social welfare loss
of the amount hi in country i (i = A;B). Consumers' surplus, domestic prots plus tari
revenue, in country i is aected by the level of CET t; we denote it by Si(t) with S00
i < 0 and
S000
i ' 0. We assume that country i's government cares about not only social welfare, given
by Si(t)   hi, but also the net total income of the lobby group.
Net prots of producers from countries A and B are given by

i(t)   hi; i = A;B; (1)
where i(t) satised i
t > 0, i
tt  0 and i
ttt ' 0.
Having introduced most of the important variables and functions, we proceed to the
solution of the optimal level of CETs. We consider a two-stage game. In stage one, domestic
3producers decide on their lobbying levels by maximizing their joint prots. In stage 2,
the CU authority decides on the level of CET by maximizing a weighted sum of the two
governments' objective functions. To obtain a sub-game perfect equilibrium we work with
backward induction. We now describe the two stages, starting with the second stage.
Let hij (i = j = A;B) be the amount of lobbying done by the rm in country i on the
government of country j. That is, hAA and hBB are domestic lobbying levels and hAB and




i(t)   hiA   hiB; i = A;B: (2)
We endogenize the tari-formation function by making the reasonable assumption that
the weight ij attached to ith lobby group's (ith rm's) prots by country j government in
its objective function (i;j = A;B), is an increasing function of the amount of lobbying it
receives. In particular, we assume5

AA = (hAA); 
BA = (hBA); 
AB = (hAB); and 
BB = (hBB); (3)
We assume that 0 > 0 and 00 < 0. The assumptions made so far are formally stated as
Assumption 1 S00
j < 0, S000
j ' 0, 
j
t(t) > 0, 
j
tt(t)  0, 
j
ttt(t) ' 0, 0(hj) > 0, 00(hj) < 0
(j = A;B).
Since lobbying now is done by the two rms individually and non-cooperatively, the
objective functions of the two governments and the CU authority are
G
A = S
A(t)   hAA   hAB + (hAA)~ 




B(t)   hBA   hBB + (hAB)~ 




A + (1   )G
B: (6)
5For notational simplicity, but without any loss of generality, we assume the functional forms to be the
same.
4In stage 2 of the game, the CU authority maximizes GCU with respect to t, giving rise
















t = 0: (7)
This simply states that the weighted average of the net marginal benets of the two member
countries is zero.











































That is, any lobbying | domestic or cross-border | increases the optimal level of the CET.
This happens primarily because lobbying increases the weight attached to prots of the lobby
group and thus the marginal benet of the CU authorities.
As for the determination of the levels of lobbying, we assume the levels of domestic
lobbying to be endogenous and the levels of cross-border lobbying to be exogenous due to
restrictions imposed on such activities. The levels of domestic lobbying are determined in
















  1 = 0; (11)
















0(hBB) =  1: (13)
The second terms on the right hand sides of (10) and (11) are the marginal costs of an
addition unit of lobbying. The rst terms are the marginal benets that occur due to an
increase in prots induced by the increase in the level of CET because of lobbying.
2.1 Cross-border lobbying and CET
Having described the equilibrium determination of domestic lobbying and CET, we shall
now examine how changes in the levels of cross-border lobbying aects the equilibrium.
Dierentiating (12) and (13) we obtain
11dhAA + 12dhBB = 13dhBA + 14dhAB; (14)
21dhAA + 22dhBB = 23dhBA + 24dhAB; (15)
where the coecients ij (i;j = A;B) are dened in the Appendix I.
We assume that second order conditions and the Nash stability conditions are satised
in the rst stage, i.e.,
Assumption 2 11 < 0; 22 < 0; 2 = 1122   1221 > 0.
Solving (14) and (15), and using assumption 2 and the signs of the coecients given in




= 1322   2312 > 0; 2 
dhBB
dhBA




= 1422   2412 > 0; 2 
dhBB
dhAB
= 1124   2114 > 0;
6Proposition 1 An increase in cross-border lobbying unambiguously increases the equilib-
rium value of a common external tari, and thus make it even larger than its non-political
equilibrium level.
As we have shown before (see (8) and (9)), cross-border lobbying, for given levels of do-
mestic lobbying, increases the optimal value of the CET. This in turn increases the marginal
prots A
t and B
t since prots are convex functions of taris (see assumption 1), and thus
the marginal benets of domestic lobbying, raising the equilibrium levels of domestic lob-
bying. Since any lobbying always increases the CET, cross-border lobbying increases the
equilibrium value of the CET directly as well as indirectly via an induced rise in the levels
of domestic lobbying.
3 Free Trade Areas
In the previous section we analyzed a Customs Union where taris against the non-member
countries are the same for the member countries. In this section we shall consider the case
of a Free Trade Area where the member countries can set their own taris against the non-
member countries. We shall do so in two ways. First, in section 3.1 we shall present a very
general analysis without invoking specic assumptions on the structure and nature of the
economies. Then in section 3.2. we shall consider specic oligopolistic model of PTA.
3.1 A General Analysis
Since each member country sets its own external tari rate, prots are functions of two tari
rates. Denoting by tA and tB the external taris set by country A and B respectively, net
prots of the rm in country i is given by:
~ 
i = 
i(tA;tB)   hiA   hiB; i = A;B;
7where, as before, hij (i = j = A;B) is the amount of lobbying done by the rm in country i
on the government of country j (i;j = A;B).
We make the following assumptions of the prot functions:
Assumption 3 i
j  0;, i
jk  0; and i
jkl ' 0 for i = A;B and j;k;l = tA;tB.
Since lobbying, as in the case of Customs Union (see (4) and (5)), is done by the two
rms individually and non-cooperatively, the objective functions of the two governments are
G
A = S
A(tA;tB)   hAA   hAB + (hAA)~ 




B(tA;tB)   hBA   hBB + (hAB)~ A + (hBB)~ B; (17)
where SA(tA;tB) and SB(tA;tB) are the sums of consumers surplus, prots and tari revenue
in the two countries.
In stage 2 of the game, each government maximizes its own objective function in a Nash
























tB = 0; (19)
which implicitly dene the response functions
tA = tA(hAA;hBB;hAB;hBA); tB = tB(hAA;hBB;hAB;hBA): (20)
Dierentiating (18) and (19), we nd
G
A
tAtA dtA + G
A
tAtB dtB =  
A
tA






tBtA dtA + G
B
tBtB dtB =  
A
tB









































We assume the second-order conditions and the Nash-stability condition to be satised,
i.e.,
Assumption 4 GA
tAtA < 0, GB










































































From (23), (24) and assumption 4, it follows that an increase in lobbying to a government
| domestic or cross-border | increases the level of optimal external taris in that country.
Equation (25) and (26) give us the eect of an increase in lobbying to a government on the
optimal external taris in the other country, and these eects are positive (negative) if and
only if taris for the two governments are strategic complements (substitutes) to each other,
i.e., if and only if GA
tAtB > 0 and GB
tBtA > 0 (GA
tAtB < 0 and GB
tBtA < 0). Formally,
9Lemma 1 An increase in the level of lobbying to the government of a country (either by
the domestic rm or by the rm in the other member country) increases the level of optimal
external taris in that country, and increases (decreases) the level of optimal taris in the
other country if taris for the two governments are strategic complements (substitutes) to
each other.
An increase in the amount of lobbying received by a government from domestic or foreign
source increases the net marginal benet of that government by increasing the value of the
weights attached to the prots of the lobby groups. This increases the optimal level of the
external tari set by that government. This is the direct eect. Indirect eects occur as
an induced increase in taris set by a country, due to lobbying received by it, aects the
marginal benets of the other country. This indirect eect is positive (negative) if taris for
the two governments are strategic complements (substitutes) to each other.
The levels of domestic lobbying are determined in the rst stage by the two lobby groups


























  1 = 0; (28)
The rst two terms on the right hand sides of the above two equations are the marginal
benets of domestic lobbying. They occur via changes in prots because of induced changes
in taris in the two countries due to lobbying. The third term is the marginal cost of
lobbying.
Totally dierentiating (27) and (28), we get
11dhAA + 12dhBB = 13dhBA + 14dhAB; (29)
21dhAA + 22dhBB = 23dhBA + 24dhAB; (30)
10where ij's are dened in Appendix II.
We assume that second order conditions and the Nash stability conditions are satised
in the rst stage, i.e.,
Assumption 5 11 < 0; 22 < 0; 4 = 1122   1221 > 0.




= 1322   2312; 4 
dhBB
dhBA




= 1422   2412; 4 
dhBB
dhAB
= 1124   2114;
Using assumption 5 and the signs of the coecients given in Appendix II, it should be
clear that if taris in the two member countries are strategic complements to each other, i.e.,
GA
tAtB > 0 and GB
tBtA > 0 , then 12 and 21 are both positive and 13, 23, 14 and 24 are
all negative. Then from the above equations it follows that the level of domestic lobbying
increases with foreign lobbying.
Proposition 2 An increase in cross-border lobbying increases equilibrium level of domestic
lobbying in both countries if taris in the two countries are strategic complements to each
other. This in turn implies that an increase in cross-border lobbying increases the optimal
levels of external taris in both countries.
From lemma 1 we know that lobbying of any kind, ceteris paribus, increases optimal
external taris if taris in the two countries are strategic complements to each other. An





tB in (27) and (28) if taris in the two countries are strategic
complements to each other. Thus, in this case, cross-border lobbying raises the levels of
domestic lobbying, and consequently the equilibrium external taris are raised directly and
indirectly via increases in the levels of domestic lobbying.
113.2 An Oligopolistic Model of FTA
We shall now put more structure to the framework analyzed in section 3.1 to throw light on
the pattern of strategic complementarity/substitutability in taris. This in turn will inform
us about the eect of cross-border lobbying on equilibrium taris in an FTA.
There are three countries: A and B are members of a FTA and a non-member country C.
There are three goods: (i) one competitive numeraire good which is exported by countries A
and B, (ii) an imperfectly competitive good which is produced and consumed in countries A
and B only, and (iii) a good that is imperfect substitute of the second good and is produced in
country C and exported to the member countries. Country C is able to discriminate between
the two markets, and the producer prices for the two markets are pC
A and pC
B respectively.
As FTA members, countries A and B can set their own import taris for this good; we
shall denote these rates by tA and tB. The market for the second good is fully integrated in
countries A and B and there is free trade.6




A;yA) = DA +  X
C
A  








B;yB) = DA +  X
C
B  





yi is the consumption of the numeraire good, XC
i is imports from country C (and domestic
consumption in country i), and Di is the domestic consumption of the third good in country
i (i = A;B).
Inverse demands function are derived from the above utility functions as:
p =    DA   X
C





A + tA =      X
C
A   DA; p
C
B + tB =      X
C
B   DB; (34)
6By construction | i.e., by the assumptions of market segmentation for country C's exports to the
member countries, and of product dierentiation between country C's exports and the good produced in the
member countries, we are ruling out the issue of `internal trade deection' as in Richardson (1995)
12Prots of the three rms in country A, B and C are:

A = (p   mA)XA; 











where XA and XB are the domestic production of the homogeneous non-numerarire good in
countries A and B respective, and mi is the constant average and marginal cost of production
in country i (i = A;B;C).7
We make the following standard assumption on the parameters:
Assumption 6     2 > 0.
Since the market for good D is fully integrated in the two member countries, we have:
DA + DB = XA + XB: (37)
Summing the two equations in (33) and using (37), we get
p =   

2








From (36), (35), (34) and (38), the rst-order Cournot-Nash prot-maximizing condition are
derived as:
p   mA =
XA
2





















7Fixed costs are excluded without any loss of generality.
13Using (34) and (38) and dierentiating (39) and (40), we get
(4    
2)dXA + (2    
2)dXB = d(tA + tB);
(2    
2)dXA + (4    
2)dXB = d(tA + tB);



















 d(XA + XB)   dtB:




















(3    2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(3    22)
2(    2)(3    2)
< 0: (43)
These results are explained as follows. Taris on a good in a country reduces imports
of that good into that country. This reduction in exports by country C prompts it to
export more to the other country. However, total exports by country C falls. This fall in
total exports in turn shifts up the inverse demand function for good D (see (38)) and this
increases the output of this good in both countries.







(2    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(6    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   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4(3    2)
: (46)
Any tari on exports by country C reduces its producer prices for both markets. The
price for good D also falls as its production levels in both countries increase.






















(5    32)





(  + 2)





(5    32)





(  + 2)
4(3    2)(    2)
< 0: (48)
A country's taris on imports from country C reduces its consumption (imports) of that
good, but increases consumption of its imperfectly substitute good D. Since taris in one
country increases exports of the same good to the other country, the consumption of its
imperfectly substitute good D in the other country goes down.









































































4(3    2)
> 0; (52)




DA(2    2)
(3    2)(    2)
+
XA
C(6    2)
4(3    2)
 
tA(3    2)







DB(2    2)
(3    2)(    2)
+
XB
C(6    2)
4(3    2)
 
tB(3    2)









44(2    2) + (    2)[ (30    172) + 22]






2(10    32)
8(3    2)2(    2)
+ 
A
tAtB > 0: (56)
Since SA
tAtB > 0, SB
tBtA > 0, it follows from the expressions of GA
tAtB and GB
tBtA (see after
(22)) and (52) that GA
tAtB > 0 and GB













Moreover, the conditions in proposition 2 are satised. Therefore, cross-border lobbying
increases domestic lobbying in both countries and thus optimal external taris in both coun-
tries.
Proposition 3 In the specic model developed in this subsection, an increase in cross-border
lobbying unambiguously increases equilibrium external tari in both member countries, and
thus make them even larger than their non-political equilibrium levels.
That is, all the assumptions made in section 3, and the conditions stated in proposition
2, are satised for the specic model in section 3.2. Taris in the two member countries are
strategic complements to each other for the following reasons. An increase in either taris
reduces total exports by country C and this shifts up the inverse demand function of good
D (see (38)) raising outputs in both member countries (see (41)). Since marginal prots are
proportional to the output levels (see (51)), the marginals prots also increase with either
16tari. Furthermore, the increase in domestic outputs in the member countries reduces the
price of the domestically produced goods (see (44)) and the producer prices of country C's
exports (see (45) and (46)). Thus, an increase in taris in one country increases the marginal
value of other components of social welfare (consumers' surplus and tari revenue), in the
other country. Taking all these together, we nd that taris in the two countries are strategic
complements to each other.
4 Conclusion
Lobbying comes in dierent shapes and sizes. However, a society's perception of domestic
lobbying tends to be very dierent from that of cross-border lobbying. It is therefore im-
perative that in formal models of lobbying, analytical distinctions are made between the the
two aforesaid forms of lobbying. In this context, it is to be noted that the literature on cross
border lobbying and its eects on trade policy is somewhat sparse. Notable exceptions are
Gawande at al. (2006) and Stoyanov (2009). These papers, however, are primarily empir-
ical and their focus is dierent from ours. We are concerned with the eect of parametric
relaxation in government policies pertaining to foreign lobbying and how that may comple-
ment (or substitute for) domestic lobbying. In turn, we focus on how tari policy against
non-member nations may change in the face of such relaxation of rules pertaining to foreign
lobbying.
In addition, we analyze eects of cross border lobbying for both an FTA and a CU.
This is both novel and important, because there are some interesting qualitative dierences
between the two regimes. Most notably, while foreign lobbying unambiguously raises the
CET in a Customs Union, the result depends on the pattern of strategic complementarity
(or substitutability) for an FTA.
Finally, it is worth noting that our analysis uses a minimum of structure as it is laid
17down in section 2 and the rst part of section 3. Thus, dierent competing models of trade
may be accommodated in such a framework, and the results extend to these contexts. It
is only in the last part of section 3 that we assume additional structure, where we use an
oligopolistic model to unravel the pattern of strategic complementarity (substitutability) in
the tari reaction functions of the member nations. To our knowledge, this is the rst paper
that examines the eects of cross border lobbying, and compares the results between an FTA
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tt
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0(hAA) > 0; (I.6)











0(hBA) < 0; (I.7)
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